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I. Executive Summary 
 The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses the gravest threat to regional security 
in the Middle East and threatens attacks against Western targets. Its rise from its preceding 
group, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), coincides with a hallmark of brutality and disregard for human 
life and rights. Rape, enslavement, genocide, murder, torture and violence against children and 
women are daily occurrences within the territories that ISIL controls (Amos 2014, 2). It operates 
within the specter of the Syrian civil war – which has resulted in the largest number of displaced 
persons in any current conflict, with 7.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 3.2 
million refugees (Amos 2014, 2) – and the sectarian divisions rife throughout Iraq. Thus, the 
most violent terrorist group to date is operating within a realm beset by humanitarian 
deprivation, state instability and increasingly fanatical sectarian warfare. Its vision of a Caliphate 
ruling through an extreme interpretation of Sharia threatens the livelihood of millions of human 
beings and breeds irrational, fundamentalist Islamists who cannot be reasoned with or pacified. 
Accordingly, I address four major points in this paper to resolve the crises imposed by ISIL in 
Iraq and Syria.  
 First, I provide a history of the circumstances that caused ISIL’s creation and made its 
strength possible. The history of AQI, the sectarian divisions within Iraq both before and after 
the 2003 U.S. invasion, and the present difficulties found within Iraq illustrate how AQI found 
support among Sunni tribes and scored several stunning military victories against the Iraqi army 
in 2014. I examine the Syrian civil war’s causes and present conditions, as well as how that 
conflict’s fanatical nature has fostered an environment friendly to ISIL and allowed its ascension 
as the most powerful armed group fighting in the region. Understanding these circumstances is 
vital to defeating ISIL and preventing its resurgence.  
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 Second, I examine three major instances in history where terrorism was combatted and 
different strategies were implemented to counter or eliminate the groups involved and the 
subsequent outcomes – the Irish Republican Army, The Tamil Tigers, and Hamas. I give brief 
histories of the conflicts, draw conclusions from each situation and offer insights on what 
strategies were effective and potentially useful against ISIL. Third, I offer three policy options 
for destroying ISIL. “Option 1” recommends minimizing our involvement to reduce civilian 
casualties, avoid risk to Coalition forces and focus solely on eliminating ISIL’s leadership. 
“Option 2” involves Coalition airstrikes against all ISIL targets, logistical support for the Iraqi 
armed forces, the Free Syrian Army and the Kurdish Peshmerga, as well as dissemination of 
battlefield intelligence to these groups. “Option 3” entails a large Coalition action that would 
create United Nations Safe Zones in Kurdish-controlled areas of Iraq and Syria to protect 
refugees and IDPs, undertake airstrikes against ISIL and provide logistical and ground support 
for the Peshmerga and Iraqi ground troops. It also calls for the declaration of a no-fly zone over 
Syria, possible strikes against Al-Assad regime targets, increased logistical and political support 
for Sunni Opposition troops, and forcing a political resolution to end the Syrian civil war.  
 Lastly, I recommend undertaking a policy that attacks the underlying issues allowing 
ISIL’s existence, prevents future humanitarian catastrophes in Iraq and Syria, and directly 
combats the group in both states.  “Option 3” offers a strategy to eradicate both ISIL and the 
forces that make its existence possible: neighboring failed states and the schism between Sunni 
and Shia in Iraq. While it is the most ambitious strategy, “Option 3” stands the best chance of 
resolving the Syrian War, forging a federation of states in Iraq, and destroying ISIL through 
direct action and undermining its bases of support. ISIL and the circumstances that led to its 
successes occurred over a long time period; thus the remedies for destroying it and rectifying 
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these circumstances will also require long-term involvement and commitment if any serious 
effort is to be successfully made. “Option 3” is difficult and is the riskiest approach because it is 
the only plan that addresses the regional power balance, governmental upheaval in Iraq, and 
undertakes the responsibility of bringing an end to the Syrian civil war. Also, eliminating the 
impetus to terrorism is as crucial as dismantling and destroying ISIL. Therefore, I recommend a 
broad and extensive engagement in the region that ends the Syrian civil war, reconstitutes Iraq as 
a federation or provides clear governance and political reconciliation, humanitarian intervention, 
and armed action to destroy ISIL and liberate the territories that it occupies.  
II. Introduction 
ISIL’s egregious human rights abuses, atrocities against minorities, execution of 
prisoners and seizure of vast territories distinguish it from previous terrorist groups, which in the 
past have used violence as a means of political change and not territorial gain. In contrast, ISIL 
has seized territory to create a Caliphate, enacting its own version of Sharia and political Islam. 
Forged out of the cauldron of the Syrian civil war and the disillusionment of Sunni tribes in the 
northwest of Iraq, ISIL advances have caused hundreds of thousands of people to flee and 
subjected millions of people to its rule. Over 130,000 Syrian Kurds fled into Turkey in a scant 
three days due to ISIL’s activities near the Syrian city of Kobane (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2014, “Thousands of Syrian Refugees Flee” 1). Thus, ISIL and its numerous 
atrocities have dramatically exacerbated the refugee crisis hemorrhaging from the Syrian 
conflict. Further, it has dramatically affected the ever-fluid balance in the Syrian civil war by 
attacking both Syrian government forces and other armed groups fighting the Assad regime. ISIL 
has emerged as the most powerful armed group fighting in Syria. It poses a serious existential 
threat to the Iraqi government and the government of Iraqi Kurdistan.  
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 ISIL emerged from the disarray of post-2003 Iraq as the remnants of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, a 
group founded and led by Jordanian national Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. The group was notorious 
for its indiscriminate suicide bombings, beheadings of prisoners and attacks against targets of 
sectarian significance (Hughes 2010, 168). Al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike in 2006, and 
eventually Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi assumed leadership of the group (Shadid 2010). ISIL’s entry 
into the Syrian civil war and seizure of territory has significantly strengthened it, along with an 
influx of experienced foreign fighters. Amid the chaos of the Syrian conflict and the sectarian 
divisions of Iraqi society, the group found itself able to seize territory spanning the two states’ 
borders and expanded its advance into Iraq. It defeated or caused the withdrawal of Iraqi army 
units defending Mosul - a city of 1.8 million people - and captured it in June 2014. ISIL also 
captured the 310,000 barrel-per-day producing Baiji refinery, dramatically expanding its ability 
to extract oil and finance its operations (The Chemical Engineer, 2014).  
 ISIL presents a unique challenge compared to terrorist organizations of the past. Other 
Islamist terrorist groups such as Somalia-based Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in Nigeria have 
seized territories, managed infrastructure and attempted governance over populations, but never 
on the scale that ISIL has demonstrated, and never emerging victorious against well trained and 
equipped armed forces of a state - particularly forces equipped and trained by the U.S. military. 
The rout of the Iraqi Army and other subsequent defeats suffered by the Iraqi government forces, 
the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Assad regime demonstrate ISIL’s ability as a capable fighting 
force. Furthermore, ISIL’s ability to finance itself through the imposition of taxes, extraction of 
oil, “protection” money from businesses it threatens, and donations by Islamic charities enable it 
to maintain its operational capabilities and fund administrative bodies over territory it seizes.  
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ISIL has threatened attacks against the United States, and possesses a number of the 
estimated 15,000 foreign fighters that have traveled to Syria in its ranks (The White House, 
2014). These European fighters pose particular concern due to their ability to return to their 
countries of origin and attack Western targets. These fighters are a serious threat to the national 
security of the United States and its allies. The conclusions of this paper provide detailed 
analysis of the circumstances surrounding ISIL’s expansion, countermeasures to address these 
circumstances, a strategy for countering ISIL both in terms of policy and direct military 
confrontation, and a framework for peace in the region. I also examine the histories and 
circumstances that allowed ISIL’s beginning and evolution into its present strength, and propose 
policy options to counteract these conditions so that ISIL’s appeal is compromised and its ability 
to find popular support is degraded. Along with an understanding of the political and ethnic 
tensions surrounding the Syria-Iraq region, I provide a nuanced explanation of the regional 
dynamics that comprise what is essentially a clashing trifecta of interests and proxy battles. 
These insights will help inform varied policy options, and enable policymakers to decide on a 
cohesive and long-term strategy for containing ISIL and its eventual elimination.  
III. The Challenges 
 ISIL’s formation would not have been possible without years of instability and chaos 
within the states of Iraq and Syria. In the case of Iraq, a Shia-dominated government alienated a 
minority Sunni population through political marginalization and purging them from the Iraqi 
military, subsequently destabilizing what was already a fragile balance of powers between ethnic 
groups while causing disenfranchisement among Iraqi Sunnis. In Syria, the civil war has entered 
its third year. Large swathes of the country easily fall within the realm of a “failed state” where 
complete absence of central authority from the Al-Assad regime or the Syrian opposition have 
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resulted in a myriad of armed groups seizing areas of influence or complete control of said 
regions. Islamic State has emerged as the most powerful of the armed groups, even as it battles 
not only the Al-Assad regime but also the Syrian opposition and other armed groups operating 
within Syria. Its success is attributable not only to its presence in both countries but also its 
formidable operational capability and contingency of experienced fighters from its years as Al 
Qaeda in Iraq and core of ex-Baathist officers. An influx of experienced foreign fighters from 
Tunisia, Chechnya and Libya has also contributed to its fighting ability. Finally, its longevity is 
also due to its ability to exploit the populations it controls (through taxes, protection racketeering 
and donations) as well as oil and resource extraction.  
 I explore each of these three dynamics – Malaki-era Iraq, the Syrian civil war and the 
presence of Al Qaeda in Iraq - and their historical contribution to the current circumstances, 
before extrapolating upon how these dynamics caused the current situation to be an 
unprecedented and difficult one.   
Sectarian Tensions in Iraq Amid the Rise of Nouri Al-Maliki 
 The government led by Nouri Al-Maliki came into power in 2006 - the same year that a 
vicious cycle of sectarian violence began, leaving thousands massacred through suicide attacks, 
car bombings, reprisal killings and abductions that ended in 2007. Maliki, a dissident of the 
Baathist regime and leader of an exiled Shia party until the U.S. invasion in 2003, initially 
seemed to be a force for sectarian reconciliation and political unity amid the crisis (Parker 2009, 
4). Sunnis, particularly those who inhabit the majority-Sunni Anbar and Diyala Provinces, were 
instrumental in reversing AQI. Although previously allied with AQI due to a disdain for the 
Shia-majority government and grievances against the military and judicial apparatus of the 
Maliki government, Sunnis felt even more threatened by AQI’s strict imposition of Sharia law 
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and its brutality towards civilians (Parker 2009, 4). There were also subtle political connotations 
to Sunni tribes allying themselves to the coalition: Sunnis felt threatened by the Shia-led 
government, whose control of Shia militias such as the Al-Sadr Army and others was 
questionable at best. At least 20,000 to 50,000 Sunni insurgents were battling the Maliki 
government and Coalition forces in 2006 according to the Coalition’s own estimates, whereas 
Shias comprised nearly 577,000 members of the Iraqi armed forces (Hughes 2010, 13). By 
switching sides and joining the fight against AQI, Sunnis hoped to win protection from the 
central government by drawing themselves closer to the U.S. coalition (Parker 2009, 4).  
 Malaki, as one might have expected, was less than keen to ally himself away from his Shia-
led bloc in the south. The “shadow state” of Anbar, Diyala, Salah-ad-din and Ninawa provinces 
had previously enjoyed heavy patronage by Saddam Hussein, who bolstered the country’s 20 
percent Sunni population while using state terror to subdue the Shia majority and Kurdish north 
(Hughes 2010, 4). Maliki, whose list of supporters included the Syrian and Iranian governments, 
was loath to cooperate with what he considered as former Baathists cooperating solely for U.S.  
favor. The Sunnis’ cooperation with foreign jihadist fighters – who in one estimate were 
responsible for nine out of ten suicide bombings since spring 2003 – did not endear the Prime 
Minister to unification either (Hughes 2010, 10). Over 10,000 Iraqis were killed by suicide 
bombers alone, enraging many moderate Sunnis and leading the Awakening movement to 
distance itself from jihadist groups, among them AQI (Hughes 2010, 19). 
 These conditions led to a shaky state held together by a farcical government supposedly 
designed along confessional lines, when in reality it was sustained by the presence of American 
and Coalition forces. Tensions between the central government and the Awakening Councils 
were palpable at one 2007 handover of provincial authority in Diyala (Parker 2009, 2). Several 
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commanders of the Awakening Councils went so far as to beg an American commander to 
protect them from pending arrest warrants issued from the Iraqi Government (Parker 2009, 2).   
Their fears were not unwarranted. Protests against arbitrary detention and imprisonment of 
thousands of Sunnis by the national government became commonplace in Anbar province and 
persisted until 2013 (Snyder 2014, 2).  
 Tensions became so prevalent in January 2014 that AQI began to act more aggressively, 
and attempted to reclaim territory in Anbar province (Snyder 2014, 2). Political reconciliation 
with former Baathists proved difficult, as Maliki’s prohibition on ex-Baathists’ inclusion in the 
2010 elections divided Sunnis among those who wanted a unity government and others who 
increasingly feared Maliki represented a Shia bloc vengeful after Sunni-led Saddam-era Iraq 
(Yamao 2012, 16). Additionally, the Maliki government’s relationships with Kurds in the north 
of the country became increasingly strained once the American troops departed. This left Arabs 
and Kurds in mixed units and absent a powerful authority or mutual loyalty (Snyder 2014, 2). A 
perceived lack of transparency in the national government and the Kurdish desire for a state 
exacerbated tensions and alienated Kurds from the Arabs (Snyder 2014, 2). As if this was not 
enough, Maliki had solidified himself as a sectarian figure when Minister of Finance Rafi al-
Issawi, Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi and Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq were all 
placed under temporary house-arrest by troops and tanks led by his son, Ahmed al-Maliki 
(Dodge 2013, 1). Maliki had previously solidified his hold on the Iraqi Special Forces, 
Intelligence Services and Iraqi Army by purging officers and members not loyal to his own 
political party or affiliated with it, thus making the arrests politically possible (Dodge 2013, 9-
11).  
 These combined factors led to a situation wherein AQI found itself welcomed as an 
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alternative to an increasingly authoritarian Maliki government, and it found support within Sunni 
provinces. While preserving its power base in Iraq and avoiding direct confrontation with the 
Maliki government, AQI had established itself and attracted fighters in another area of political 
instability – Syria.  
The Syrian Civil War 
 The uprising against the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad began in early 2011 
as a reoccurrence of the Arab Spring and a manifestation of Sunni grievances against the 
minority Allawite-led government. Political and administrative powers had been collectively 
seized by the Assad regime, which filled government positions with members of its Allawite sect 
(Al-Azm 2014, 2). Most of the government and senior positions within Syria’s armed forces are 
comprised of Allawites or other minorities, such as Christians or Druze, in a country where 60 
percent of the population is Sunni (Carpenter 2013, 1-2). Political repression against the Sunni 
majority has occurred for decades, and sectarian tensions had risen to the breaking point by the 
time the Arab Spring reached Syria. The predictable response of the Al-Assad regime was a 
repressive and severe crackdown; peaceful protestors were arrested en masse or shot by snipers. 
Torture was widespread and numerous members of the military began to refuse orders to fire on 
fellow Syrians (Al-Azm 2014, 4).  
 As the protests and revolts became more widespread the regime engaged in wholesale 
slaughter and destruction of areas it could not control or compel into submission, even resorting 
to chemical warfare in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta (Al-Azm 2014, 5). The ferocity of the 
conflict and extreme violence undertaken by the regime began to be mirrored by the forces 
opposing it, and the conflict dissolved into all-out sectarian warfare pitting the Allawites and 
their minority allies against a mix of Free Syrian Army (FSA) moderate opposition forces and 
 Bowie 10 
 
numerous Al-Qaeda inspired jihadist groups, such as Al-Nusra Front – once considered the 
preeminent fighting contingent in Syria, until the advent of ISIL. The Syrian conflict also began 
to attract an increasing number of foreign jihadists, including as many as 1,000 experienced 
Northern Caucasian fighters who had already fought against the Soviets and considered the 
Assad regime to be infidels (Souleimanov 2014, p. 1). This influx also included Chechens, 
Dagastanis, and Libyans, and in total comprised the second-largest group of fighters next to non-
Syrian Arabs. Their arrival was greeted with a mixture of enthusiasm – for their fighting prowess 
– and dismay for their seemingly oblivious violence towards non-combatants (Souleimanov 
2014, 1).  
 The Assad regime continued to fight with complete disregard for civilian casualties, 
employing tactics such as razing entire neighborhoods or using so-called “barrel bombs” – 
essentially barrels packed with explosives and shrapnel – indiscriminately and with devastating 
effect. The Assad regime relied upon its Iranian backers, along with Iranian Special Forces and 
Lebanese Hezbollah fighters to bolster its ranks against the jihadist influx and flare-ups in the 
conflict (Al-Azm 2014, 6). As the fighting became more decentralized and reliant upon the 
strengths of militias for the Assad regime, so did the level of extremism among the ranks of 
Islamist fighters fighting against it and – increasingly – the secular Syrian opposition, which was 
not as well equipped or financed as many of the foreign jihadi groups. While fanatical groups 
such as Al-Nusra – the Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria – fought against the Assad regime, they also 
espoused anti-American views and are Sunni extremists (Totten 2013, 3). Fighters from across 
the Gulf States are driven by the perception that the Middle East has been a pawn of Western 
interests and post-imperialism since the inception of Israel. (Tudor 2010, 5). A merger between 
the Al-Nusra Front and ISIL – if it does occur – will ensure yet another civil war between these 
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Sunni groups and the moderate Syrian Opposition, even if Al-Assad’s forces are defeated 
(Brinkley 2013, 10). Further, these Sunni fighters could also return to their own states in a form 
of blowback, or threaten a traditional enemy on the periphery of the conflict: Israel. Al-Nusra has 
already shelled the Israeli-held Golan Heights and controls the territory adjacent to them 
(Brinkley 2013, 10).  
 Al-Assad himself did everything he could to make the conflict as sectarian as possible, 
both to bolster the claim that he is battling fanatics and to keep his internal allies (Hezbollah, 
Iran, Iraqi Shias and Russia) closer to him (Totten 2013, 3-4). Besides the wholesale butchery of 
Sunni neighborhoods through shelling and barrel bombing, Al-Assad also released thousands of 
jihadist prisoners from his jails as he simultaneously arrested thousands of liberal activists and 
political opponents (Salloum 2013, 3). And, while in 2013, analysts such as Totten believed that 
groups such as Al-Nusra Front were doomed due to either the Assad regime’s survival or failure, 
the sectarian nature of the war in 2014 makes that assertion shaky at best. The protracted conflict 
has only exacerbated extremism on both sides and made the Syrian Sunnis more desperate. As 
this coincided with the disintegration of relationships between the Iraqi Sunnis and Shias, AQI 
realized a power vacuum existed – one that they would fill.  
Al Qaeda in Iraq becomes The Islamic State of Iraq and The Levant  
 AQI began crossing into Syria and fighting alongside the Al-Nusra Front, the officially 
branded Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria in 2012. The battles against the Al-Assad regime became 
more fanatical, with the use of suicide bombings and an increasing number of jihadist fighters 
emigrating from Turkey, Chechnya and European states to participate in a struggle against what 
they regarded as an infidel regime (Salloum 2013, 1-3). With the influx of foreign combatants 
came a power struggle among the groups as to who was in charge and carried religious edict. In 
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the midst of this chaos, AQI branded itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). They would later be known simply as Islamic State (IS). The 
group was reproached by Al Qaeda’s leader, Aman Al-Zawhari, for brutality and for its attempts 
to assert its authority over Al-Nusra Front and absorb its fighters into ISIL’s ranks (Berger 2014, 
1).  
 As a result, ISIL formally split itself away from Al Qaeda in February 2014 (Phillips 2014, 
3). It found sympathy among Iraqi Sunnis who felt disenfranchised from the Maliki-led central 
government, and recruited numerous Syrian fighters who saw a well-armed and organized group 
capable of defeating regime forces (Phillips 3-5). The group’s leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, 
projected a vision of jihadist and Sunni Arab revivalism, repeatedly invoking the group’s aim to 
dispose of states established by the 1918 Sykes-Picot agreement and proclaiming the formation 
of a Caliphate – an Islamic State with one single religious and political leader – in June 2014. 
This apparition appealed to many jihadists, who already harbored anti-western resentment 
following the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, viewed any non-adherents to Salafist Islam 
as infidels worthy only of conversion or death, and desired a return to “traditional” Islam (Alvi 
2014, 2).  
Current Circumstances and Actions Taken 
 ISIL has blistered across both Syria and Iraq, racking up a number of resounding military 
victories capturing a vast amount of territory spanning both Iraq and Syria (see Figure 1.1). As of 
September 12th, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimated IS’s strength at 31,000 fighters 
in both Syria and Iraq (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2014, “Islamic State Fighter Estimates 
Triple – CIA.”), while the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights gauged ISIL’s strength in Syria 
at 50,000 fighters, not including its fighters in Iraq (Al Jazeera, 2014). ISIL seized the Iraqi city 
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of Mosul – the country’s second-most populous at 1.8 million – in June 2014, as well as the 
nearby Baiji refinery, capable of producing 310,000 barrels of oil per day (The Chemical 
Engineer, 2014). It captured numerous munitions, artillery pieces, armored fighting vehicles and 
aircraft from the retreating Iraqi army.  
 In the wake of these astonishing advances, ISIL has committed egregious human rights 
abuses against religious and ethnic minorities in the areas it controls. The United Nations, in a 
report published by both the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and UNHCR, accused 
ISIL of: 
attacks directly targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, executions and other targeted 
killings of civilians, abductions, rape and other forms of sexual and physical violence 
perpetrated against women and children, forced recruitment of children, destruction or 
desecration of places of religious or cultural significance, wanton destruction and looting 
of property, and denial of fundamental freedoms (United Nations 2014, 1).  
 
 The report also highlighted numerous instances in which religious minorities had been 
targeted, their religious or cultural sites desecrated and destroyed, the execution of captured Iraqi 
soldiers and evidence that these attacks were of a systemic and premeditated nature (United 
Nations 2014, 1-2).  
 In light of these facts and the unraveling security situation, U.S. President Barack Obama 
announced on September 14, 2014 that the United States would conduct airstrikes within Syria 
and Iraq against ISIL targets, supported by a coalition of 36 other countries that would assist and 
supply groups fighting against ISIL (Eilperin and O’Keefe, 2014). He also called for Congress to 
authorize an additional $500 million in aid to train “The Syrian Opposition” rebels, which would 
presumably fight both ISIL and the Assad regime simultaneously. Meanwhile, Kurdish 
Peshmerga forces, Shia militias and the regular Iraqi Army have been fighting ISIL in a series of 
battles ranging from Fallujah to the outskirts of Mosul (see Figure 1.1).  
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 The field of alliances, while decidedly against ISIL’s odds on paper, reflect the schisms of 
the international community and conflicting regional interests that prevent large-scale 
coordination against the group. ISIL retains the support of numerous Sunni militias in Iraq and 
Syria, ordinary Sunni-Iraqis opposed to the central Iraqi government, and an influx of foreign 
fighters seeking jihad and to join what they perceive as the new Caliphate. Against it are arrayed 
a number of state and non-state actors. The Coalition includes the Iraqi government and its 
armed forces (including independent Shia militias), the Kurdish Peshmerga (in both Iraq and 
Syria), France, the United Kingdom, and over three-dozen other countries including some Arab 
Gulf states. Meanwhile, the Al-Assad regime, Iran, Turkey, the Al-Nusra Front, the Free Syrian 
Army and numerous other armed groups in Syria are also hostile towards ISIL but lack 
coordination and hold conflicting interests. 
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Figure 1.1 (Areas of ISIL influence or control as of June 14th, 2014) 
 
IV. Literature Review  
 
 Combating the type of terrorism perpetrated by ISIL will be far from easy. In frank terms, 
ISIL and the conflicts it operates within are unprecedented in terms of difficulty and complexity, 
and for a variety of reasons. Unlike previous terrorist groups – save for the Somalian group Al 
 Bowie 16 
 
Shabaab (The Youth) and the Nigerian Boko Haram (translating to “western education is 
forbidden”) jihadists – ISIL seeks to actively control territory, and operated as both a terrorist 
group and a militia of sorts. Its ideological impetus stems from an archaic, extremist 
interpretation of Islamic Sharia law, and with it the imposition of the historic Islamic empire, the 
Caliphate. Thus, while ISIL operates within the confines of the failed Syrian state and the 
disarray of Sunni Iraq, and launches what traditionally are considered terrorist attacks (suicide 
bombings, asymmetrical warfare and attacks against politicians and military figures), it also 
operates as an armed group fighting for and administering territory. It also does so in the midst of 
conflicting regional powers vying for control in both Iraq and Syria. However, it can still be 
defined as a terrorist organization due to the extreme tactics of intimidation it commits, its 
emphasis of attacks upon non-combatants, and its goals of political and territorial change through 
the intimidation of parties removed from the conflict (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 3).  
 Subsequently, it is helpful to analyze how previous terrorist groups were dismantled and 
defeated so as to derive conceivable solutions to defeat ISIL. I will analyze three main instances 
in which terrorism has been defeated or combatted – the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland, 
the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Palestinian organization Hamas – and draw lessons from 
these three case studies.  
The Irish Republican Army: 
 The IRA stemmed from a resistance organization known as the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood (IRB) that waged violence against the British Empire’s invasion and consolidation 
of Northern Ireland (Hoyt 2012, p. 5.) It struggled for over 140 years, collectively against both 
the British Empire and Northern Irish Loyalists that opposed the disintegration of Northern 
Ireland and the creation of an independent Republic of Ireland (Hoyt 2012, 6-11). The IRA used 
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effective guerilla and insurgent-style attacks, divesting itself to the countryside and attacking 
isolated outposts as a means of attrition warfare (Hoyt 2012, 11). When confronted with British 
military forces, the IRA would instead launch even greater numbers of attacks (albeit some 
smaller in scale) to give the impression that the British military intervention was ineffective 
(Hoyt 2012, 11). The IRA experienced fits of success and defeat until 1939, when it disastrously 
drew both the condemnation of the Irish government and declared a new campaign against the 
British – nearly coinciding with the outbreak of World War II (Hoyt 2012, 8). Bombings maimed 
and killed civilians, resulting in condemnations from all parties and not merely the British 
government (Hoyt 2012, 8). This was not in itself surprising, as the group had been declared 
illegal by the independent government of Ireland in the 1930s and the British public faced far 
more lethal bombing from the Nazis in the years following 1939 (Hoyt 2012, 8-9).  
 Little changed and no concessions were made, even as a military stalemate was evident to 
both sides by the 1970s; however, the lack of a political settlement or redressing of Republican 
grievances meant that no solution produced itself until much later than necessary (Jorge et al 
2011, p 15). The protracted conflict lasted until the early 1990s, when it finally became clear to 
all parties that the IRA could not defeat the British forces and that British forces would never 
fully eliminate the IRA (Hoyt 2012, 15). This coincided with an inclusion of Irish Republican 
interests in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement – Republicans stated that this was the first occasion 
where their political concerns were addressed and acted upon (Jorge et al 2011, 13).  
 The IRA officially declared that it was ending its offensive operations in 1994, leading to 
consolidation between Irish Republicans and Loyalists, but lingering fanatics still remained 
(Clubb 2014, 5). To counter the possibility that a fanatic would launch an attack, the IRA had to 
undergo a process of disengagement, which manifested in three critical steps – (1) disarmament, 
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(2) de-mobilization, and (3) reintegration, or DDR (Clubb 2014, 5). DDR campaigns reduced the 
risk of a continuation of conflict, provided avenues of reintegration into military or political 
structures, and allowed former fighters to report plots from other ex-members, thus preventing a 
reoccurrence of violence. The IRA formally declared its demobilization and renounced violence 
in 2005 (Clubb 2014, 6); however, Loyalist fighters who were loath to give up their weapons, 
disaffected members of the former IRA, and prominent members who went on to create splinter 
groups (Clubb 2014, 6-7).  
 The IRA’s legacy and how the conflict between Republican, Loyalist and the British ended 
are hardly glamorous examples of how terrorism can be resolved. Decades of insurgent-style 
warfare, bombings, military reprisals and thousands of civilian deaths eventually gave way to 
political concessions and mutual recognition. While political consolidation is hardly a method 
applicable to ideological fanatics such as IS fighters, undermining their support by recognizing 
Sunni grievances and interests in both Syria, and more pertinently Iraq, are examples of where 
this approach could be applied. If Sunnis were not disenfranchised by the Iraqi government they 
would almost certainly exchange its authority for ISIL’s brutal rule and massacres against their 
religious-minority neighbors. However, this phenomena – the switching of sides by Sunnis 
opposed to ISIL rule – would almost certainly not occur in a uniform fashion, hence the need for 
DDR campaigns and the long-term imposition of a peace-building process. Sunnis will need 
mediums for reporting radicalism to a central authority, a trust-building reconciliation that results 
in either disarmament or inclusion of Sunnis into the Iraqi armed forces. Reintegration into the 
Iraqi government – or stronger political processes that guarantee transparency – will be 
imperative in ensuring a successful transformation.   
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Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers: 
 The struggle waged by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) underlined an ethnic 
conflict with similarities to the current situation in Iraq. The indigenous Tamils, who comprised 
approximately 12.5 percent of the population, are of different ethnic identity, language, and 
religion than the majority (74.5 percent) Sinhala (Samaranayake 2007, 2). The Sinhala-speaking 
Sinhalese, who are of Indian descent and Buddhist, consider themselves the authentic inhabitants 
of the country, whereas the Tamils believe in Hinduism, speak mostly Tamil and are 
geographically separated from the south-western and central-dwelling Sinhalas, instead being 
concentrated mostly in the north and east of the country (Samaranayake 2007, 2-3). The schism 
between the two groups resulted in a Tamil separatist movement. Violence broke out beginning 
after the withdrawal of British forces and subsequent independence of Sri Lanka in 1948 
(Samaranayake 2007, 2). Ethnic riots occurred in 1956, 1958, 1978 and 1983.  
 These only served as the impetus for the separatist movement to take action, as the 1983 
riots were especially ferocious (Samaranayake 2007, 4). High levels of Tamil unemployment, 
disenchantment with the Sinhala government and a weak security state all contributed to the rise 
of the LTTE, which grew into prominence out of an initial 35 groups and a great deal of 
infighting (Samaranayake 2007, 4-5). The LTTE employed guerilla warfare, political 
assassinations, insurgent attacks, massacres against civilians and most notably suicide bombings 
as its operational tactics. This tactic in particular drew notoriety; LTTE was the first group to 
“perfect” the use of suicide vests and bombings according to the FBI (DeVotta 2009, 2).  In 
some manners these preconditions and tactics deployed draw similarities with the situations in 
Syria and Iraq presented by ISIL; however, the LTTE had little ideological impulse aside from a 
smattering of Tamil nationalism. Its grievances stemmed largely from a sense of political 
 Bowie 20 
 
impotence and ethnic grievances against the Sinhalese. The scale of the conflict also draws less 
comparison to Iraq or Syria; although horrific, a total of 6,749 civilians were casualties of LTTE 
attacks from 1984 to 2004 (Samaranayake 2007, 8).  
 The resolution of the LTTE insurgency came about through a variety of external and 
internal factors. As with the Irish Republican Army, the paths to inclusion and peace were 
unglamorous, hampered repeatedly and hewn out over a long and arduous process. First, a 
number of external peacekeeping forces were deployed to bear in an attempt to end the conflict 
or draw buffer zones between the combatants. This began with the Indian Peacekeeping Force in 
1987. The force’s inception derived from an agreement between the Sri Lankan government and 
India– LTTE was not a party to the agreement – but ultimately resulted in failure, with the 
force’s withdrawal in 1990 after suffering 1,200 losses (Roberts 2014, 5). A 2002 Norewigan 
peacekeeping delegation spearheaded the creation of a ceasefire agreement (CAF) and the 
deployment of a peacekeeping force, The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). Both the Sri 
Lankan Prime Minister and the LTTE leader signed the CFA, but sporadic violence still 
continued despite the presence of the SLMM (Roberts 2014, 5-6). Despite its initial aspirations, 
the CFA was repeatedly broken by the LTTE and resulted in the termination of the SLMM in 
2008. The Sri Lankan government withdrew from the CFA a scant two weeks later (Roberts 
2014, 5).  
 The third and final external intervention came about amid more attempts at political 
solutions. The presence of UN and NGO personnel in designated “safe areas” within the country 
compelled an end of hostilities in these limited areas, although they were frequently violated by 
both the Sri Lankan government forces and the LTTE (Roberts 2014, 6). The result was an 
international outcry underlining every instance in which the safe areas became death zones due 
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to shelling or suicide bombings, and the UN was able to pursue peace initiatives under the 
auspices of Right to Protect (or R2P) doctrine. Subsequently, the UN took humanitarian crises 
and civilian deaths as much more serious violations than it had before the adoption of the R2P 
doctrine in 2005 (Roberts 2014, 6-7). However, an international presence of UN and NGO 
personnel was not enough to stop the conflict.  
 The unraveling of the LTTE occurred for a number of reasons. First, it attracted 
international condemnation through its use of suicide attacks and high-profile political 
assassinations (DeVotta 2009, 21). The group was responsible for the assassination of the Indian 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and engaged in money-laundering, financial fraud and 
human trafficking within numerous states, leading thirty countries to label it a terrorist 
organization by the end of 2001 (DeVotta 2009, 21). Second, the group supported a nationalist 
presidential candidate, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who in turn had no qualms over resolving the 
conflict through pure military force rather political concessions or a distributive system of power. 
Third, and perhaps most fatally, it underwent internal fissures that doomed its capability as both 
a political and military threat (DeVotta 2009, 21-22). The Sri Lankan military, at the behest of 
Rajapaska, finally seized control of the entire country in May 2009, leading to the LTTE’s 
surrender.  
 What can be learned from the LTTE example? External intervention is sometimes 
ineffective despite the best intentions, and that the creation of “safe zones” is not a guarantee that 
the areas will be a sanctuary for civilians or act as effective buffers between warring parties. 
Another observation to be made is that the creation of safe zones made the conflict international, 
with nations paying attention and popular outcry following every violation of these safe havens. 
One route to defeating ISIL lies in securing the Syrian state as prerequisite to uniting both the 
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Al-Assad regime and the Free Syrian Army against their common existential enemy. A method 
of accomplishing a small manner of cooperation would be the establishment of humanitarian 
corridors to be controlled or policed by a neutral third party or UN detachment, such as the case 
with the UN mission to the Balkans. However, as was the case in the Balkan conflict and above 
demonstrated in the LTTE insurgency, such safe zones can be easily compromised and 
exacerbate rather than mitigate the conflict.  
 Military defeat and international ire were the main components to defeating the LTTE and 
ensuring its final demise. However, these options are not immediately available for use against 
ISIL, nor would they necessarily be effective if employed against it. The LTTE never posed 
much more than an internal threat to the Sinhala population. While it carried out the 
assassination of a prominent foreign political leader, it did not have territorial ambitions beyond 
Sri Lanka itself. Nor did it attract numerous foreign fighters to its cause, massacre thousands of 
prisoners and civilians or threaten the regional balance of powers, as ISIL has done and seems 
poised to do if it remains unchecked. Moreover, the LTTE did not carry a significant ideological 
or religious impetus as part of its appeal; its struggle was purely political and ethnic. The failures 
of external peacemakers to solve the LTTE crisis should be observed as possible lessons or 
cautionary notes for external action in areas controlled by ISIL.   
Israel and Hamas: 
 Hamas’s origins stem from the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat the 
Mouqawama of Islamiyya), as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Cepoi 2013, 4). 
Hamas emerged from this organization as an armed militant group combating the Israeli 
occupation of the Gaza Strip during the Intifida (Cepoi 2013, 4). However, this was not the 
original composition of Hamas. Its initial charter declared itself as the Palestinian branch of the 
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Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and derived its authority from Islamic principles of law. It 
proclaimed that Jihad was a struggle every Muslim should seek, even to death, particularly in 
instances where Muslim lands were occupied (Cepoi 2013, 5). Hamas benefited from numerous 
charities, social organizations and schools the Muslim Brotherhood had established in Israel 
prior to its inception (Cepoi 2013, 5).  
 While founded on militaristic Islamist concepts, Hamas became an authoritative movement 
when a right-wing Israeli political coalition rose and continued oppressing the Intifada in 1989. 
The group called for the destruction of Israel, liberation of Palestinian lands, and combined 
principles of Islamism with a populist movement emerging from the suffering Palestinians 
endured.  
 Israel confronted Hamas in a particularly heavy-handed manner, sealing off access to the 
West Bank in 2004 in the aftermath of the 2000 Second Intifidah. In the preceding three years, 
867 Israeli deaths were attributed to terrorism perpetrated by Hamas and other Islamist militancy 
groups (Byman 2012, 1). These attacks involved shootings, suicide bombings, and cross-border 
fire from the Gaza Strip. Following the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Hamas won 74 
out of 132 seats in the 2005 Legislative Council elections for the Palestinian Authority, 
compared to Fatah’s 45 (Rolston 2014, 5-6). The Islamic tenants of Hamas stood in contrast with 
Mahmoud Abbas’s nationalist Fatah movement, which was confined to the occupied West Bank 
following the 2005 elections. Thus, Hamas formally seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2006 
(Marshall 2014, 2). The Gaza War of 2008-2009 caused significant damage to the Gaza Strip, 
with much of it demolished (Marshall 2014, 3). However, Israel was unable to wrest Hamas from 
the Gaza Strip, and it remained in control of the entire territory. Israel’s unilateral ceasefire was 
followed by a strict embargo on most goods crossing into the Gaza Strip. A double fence, 
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concrete barrier, numerous guard towers and a naval blockade cordon the entire Gaza Strip, 
allowing Israel to control all economic and personal movement in and out of the area (Al-Haq 
2014, 4).  
 Cross border rocket-fire by Hamas in retaliation for the murder of a Palestinian teenager by 
Jewish radicals resulted in Israel launching Operation Protective Edge in July 2004 (Sprusansky 
2014, 4). This war involved heavy bombing and shelling by Israel, including a limited ground 
invasion, resulting in 73 Israeli and in excess of 2,100 Palestinian deaths (British Broadcasting 
Corporation 2014, “Gaza Crisis.”). Despite the conflict, Hamas still remains more popular than 
Fatah because of the popular perception that it “stands up” to Israel, rather than engaging in 
political negotiations (Marshall 2014, 3).  
 What can be learned from the Israeli and Hamas conflict? First, that unlike ISSL, Hamas 
has civilian and political interests at stake that Israel can leverage and negotiate with (Vick 2014, 
1). Secondly, that direct armed conflict without redressing of political or social grievances only 
protracts conflict rather than ending it. Israel possesses the best equipped and supplied military in 
the Middle East, has blockaded Hamas’s area of control for years, invaded the Gaza Strip twice 
in the last decade, and still has not defeated the group. Budget considerations of the Israeli 
Defense Force aside, pure military action against Hamas has only backfired on Israel, resulting in 
Hamas’s increased popularity among Palestinians in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 
Therefore, we can conclude that even protracted and heavy military action alone will not 
eradicate a terrorist group that enjoys popular support among the population it originates from. 
Political negotiations and ideological warfare must also be considered in any long-term effort to 
address the causes of terrorism. While direct political negotiations with ISIL extremists are 
unlikely to be successful, attempts at redressing Sunni tribal grievances in Iraq may succeed if 
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the new Iraqi government can either grant more local autonomy or govern in a more inclusive 
fashion.  
V. Proposed Responses 
Option 1: Minimalist Approach – no boots on the ground; support existing allies financially 
and logistically; conduct “targeted strikes” against ISIL leadership 
The Policy: Direct American involvement in the Middle East has only resulted in protracting 
conflicts without addressing the causes behind them, while incurring American casualties and 
extremely expensive operations. The chaos of the Syrian civil war or the schisms within Iraqi 
politics are issues that cannot be resolved by external forces. This policy recommends an absence 
of large-scale airstrikes and advocates instead for as small a footprint as possible for the U.S. 
coalition. Coalition countries would support Peshmerga, Iraqi Army and FSA forces against ISIL 
through financial contributions and the provision of weapons and supplies. Bankrolling these 
armed forces will allow them to purchase the equipment they need and pay their fighters. 
Additionally, it gives them the latitude needed to bribe or buy local tribes’ loyalty if needed, as is 
common practice in Sunni tribal areas and has been done by ISIL. The United States and its 
coalition would also support commanders and armed forces through intelligence-gathering and 
sharing, political backing, and granting international legitimacy to their efforts and gains. The 
use of drones to gather intelligence is already being conducted by the United States within Syria, 
and drones are also able to provide real-time battlefield intelligence for ground forces (Entous, 
Barnes, Nissenbaum, 2014, 1). Armed action would only be undertaken through precision 
airstrikes or drone attacks against ISIL leadership targets or clearly identified convoys. The goal 
of this strategy is to minimize civilian casualties caused by Coalition involvement and avoid 
repeating shock-and-awe tactics that may have been militarily effective but vaporized popular 
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support for Western forces.  
 This policy offers two main strengths. First, it abstains from Coalition airstrikes that could 
potentially kill civilians and turn local ire against the West and bolster support for anti-Western 
groups, such as ISIL. Second, it keeps a large-scale deployment of U.S. and Coalition forces out 
of the region. This avoids the possibility of Coalition casualties and instead places the onus of 
ground fighting on the indigenous forces that will control the territory they seize. Shared 
intelligence centers would be instituted between the Coalition and the Baghdad government in 
Baghdad, while similar centers would be established in the Kurdish city of Erbil. Meanwhile, the 
Coalition can still contribute to the cause through supporting the different groups with arms, 
supplies and financial backing, while avoiding the entanglements that airstrikes or deployment of 
ground forces would entail. This strategy allows the Coalition to focus on eliminating the 
leadership of ISIL while the regional ground forces take ownership of the fight – a fight for 
territory that they will eventually control.  
Option 2: Proxy Warfare and Coalition Airstrikes - advise and support Kurdish, FSA and 
Iraqi ground forces  
The Policy: This policy recommends attacking ISIL through Coalition-led airstrikes while 
simultaneously lending logistical, training and field-advising support to regional ground forces. 
Coalition airstrikes will degrade ISIL capability by attacking field positions, convoys, logistical 
centers, communication lines and individual ISIL leaders, while regional ground forces advance 
and roll back ISIL militants and reclaim lost territory. Coalition forces will also provide training 
and weaponry to our allies in the region that oppose ISIL and the Al-Assad regime. In Iraq this 
involves directly supporting the Iraqi-Kurdish Peshmerga and the regular Iraqi Army (currently 
Shia-dominated), while in Syria it entails aiding Syrian Kurds and the overwhelmingly Sunni – 
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but moderate - FSA.  
 This approach strengthens the moderate FSA, bolsters the Iraqi Army and Kurdish 
Peshmerga and provides a roadmap for the retaking and rehabilitation of ISIL-controlled areas in 
Iraq and Syria. While it involves increased Coalition involvement, it minimizes risks to Coalition 
personnel and still gives the responsibility of ground fighting to the forces that will eventually 
control the territory. Coalition airstrikes will attack targets outside of regional ground forces’ 
reach and provide local air superiority when the ground forces are engaged. The CIA has 
indicated that a sustained bombing campaign would require ground-level spies in order to 
facilitate accurate strikes; therefore a substantial covert presence will be essential in order to 
ensure successful attacks (Stein 2014, 2). These combined factors will prove decisive in battles 
where logistical support and the ability to bring up reinforcements for protracted conflicts are 
essential.  
 It also allows regional Coalition members to play a wider role in the effort, as they can 
provide host cites for training moderate Syrian rebels and bases for airstrikes against ISIL. They 
would also be able to financially and logistically support elements fighting ISIL and other 
extremist groups while keeping their own armed forces safe, avoiding a “boots on the ground” 
strategy. This is largely the policy being conducted now by the Obama administration. However, 
airstrikes alone along with training support may not prove sufficient to destroy ISIL (Stansfield 
2014, 11).   
Option 3: Direct Action and Détente in Iraq and Syria – airstrikes against Assad to force a 
détente and political resolution to the Syrian Civil War, establishment of UN Safe Zones 
within Kurdish territories, and an all-of-the-above military strategy against ISIL 
The Policy: Destroying ISIL cannot be accomplished so long as the Syrian civil war continues 
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and areas of the country lay outside of control of either the Assad government or the Free Syrian 
Army. The humanitarian crisis is a concern as well. Refugee camps are often ideal breeding 
grounds for extremism, such as they were for the Taliban when Afghan refugees fled to camps in 
Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan conflict. According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 3.2 million refugees had fled from Syria by November 
2014 (Amos 2014, 2). The possibility that these refugees could be radicalized by the brutality 
they have witnessed should not be ignored. Therefore political, humanitarian and Machiavellian 
concerns call for an intervention to end the Syrian civil war before more radicalization occurs.  
 We should well consider the Balkans conflict of the 1990s, wherein NATO airstrikes 
played a crucial role in causing Slobodan Milosevic to assert more authority over Serbian groups 
and generals and helped bring an end to the conflict at the Dayton Accords. In the case of Syria, 
the “Right to Protect” protocol should be invoked and Coalition airstrikes should bomb Syrian 
targets that are instrumental to their war effort. The targets of this bombing would include 
munitions dumps, airfields, artillery units shelling innocent civilians in cordoned-off cities, and 
critical military infrastructure such as command and control centers. These airstrikes should be 
undertaken with a mind towards saving lives and weakening – not destroying - the Syrian armed 
forces, as the ultimate aim of the strikes is to force Al-Assad to the negotiating table with the 
Syrian Opposition and mete out a peace deal. Weakening Al-Assad too much could upset the 
regional balance of power and cause regime areas to be overrun by ISIL and other jihadist 
groups.  
 The former United Kingdom Chief of Defense, General Sir David Richards was quoted as 
saying “air power alone will not win a campaign like this…You have to put your own boots on 
the ground at some point or else you have to very energetically and aggressively train up those 
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who will do that for us and with us” (Stansfield 2014, 13). Accordingly, an all-encompassing 
approach is required to put a permanent end to this conflict. Intelligence gathering and airstrikes 
will be helpful but not decisive methods of achieving victory.  
 This policy proposes the creation of United Nations Safe Zones (UNSZs) within Kurdish-
controlled areas of Syria and Iraq, along with both Kurdish and FSA border corridors of both 
Iraq and Turkey once these areas are firmly controlled by the forces concerned. Specific cities 
and sites would include Kirkuk and Erbil in Iraq, and Hassakeh and northwest of Aleppo in Syria 
(see Figure 1.1). These UNSZs would be created and maintained in the style of the safe zones 
that were implemented in the Balkans Conflict and the LTTE Conflict, with Coalition air support 
and UN or Coalition troops securing the areas in conjunction with Peshmerga ground forces. 
Steps such as DDR campaigns would help reintegrate Sunnis into a new Iraqi civil society and 
provide a bulwark against new insurgencies in Sunni tribal areas. Meanwhile, Peshmerga forces 
would be expected to conduct the bulk of frontline fighting against ISIL, while Coalition forces 
would provide territorial security, artillery and airstrike support as needed – all while mediating 
between the Sunni tribes and the new Iraqi government.  
 In Syria, these combined actions would bring a temporary halt to the refugee crisis. 
Furthermore, this process would hasten the process of negotiations between the Assad regime 
and the Syrian opposition, as both elements would be subjected to further international scrutiny 
amid the presence of UN personnel. Jihadist elements would be attacked and rooted out from 
within the UNSZs by Coalition airstrikes and Peshmerga forces working in conjunction with 
U.S. ground advisors.  
 This development is designed to cause ISIL to react in one of two ways – either intensify 
their attacks against the newly-created UNSZs and Peshmerga-controlled areas, or retreat from 
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these areas and focus its fighting against the Assad and Free Syrian Army forces. If the first case 
were to occur, superior Coalition and UN forces would be able to destroy ISIL troops, which 
would then be forced into an insurgency or hit-and-fade style of warfare. If the latter were to 
occur, both the Syrian Opposition and the Assad regime would face increased pressure as they 
would be bearing the brunt of ISIL and jihadist attacks, and both sides would be further 
compelled to end the war and accept a political solution. Whether this resulted in power-sharing 
or the splitting-up of Syria into different states (balkanization) would have to be determined 
during direct negotiations between the Assad government and the Syrian Opposition.  
 In either case, securing borders and defining state boundaries would be of foremost 
importance to both sides. A successful political outcome would allow both the opposition forces 
and the Assad regime to fight against their common enemy: ISIL, Al-Nusra Front, and other 
jihadist groups fighting in the country. ISIL would find itself caught between the UNSZs and the 
united forces of the Syrian Opposition and the Assad government, and likely be annihilated. 
Such an agreement would also curtail ISIL’s ability to control border crossings with Turkey and 
Iraq that are not under Kurdish control, and deprive ISIL of the benefits it enjoys by controlling 
these crossings.  
 Forcing a political solution would require Western powers to actively force equilibrium 
between Assad’s forces and the Free Syrian Army, thus compelling Assad to undertake 
negotiations. While it is unlikely that Assad will give up the Presidency of his own state, it is 
possible that he will grant control of local or regional areas to opposition forces. If the outcome 
of political negotiations is balkanization – the creation of separate states for pro-Assad areas and 
opposition territories – Assad would likely remain as head of state for the area of regime control. 
In either case, the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime would still have to contend with areas 
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of Syria held by the Al-Nusra Front and ISIL. Fanatical Salifist and Islamist groups are a 
common enemy of both the Allawites and the “moderate” Sunni-majority opposition; thus both 
they and the Kurdish forces would be free to concentrate their combined capabilities against 
jihadist-controlled territories in Syria. This option offers a more permanent solution to the 
problem – the ability of jihadist groups, such as ISIL, to fester in conflict areas and the ending of 
the increasingly fanatical and destructive Syrian civil war. It also addresses the issue of failed-
state areas that have been controlled by ISIL and other jihadist groups, such as Al Nusra. It also 
preserves the fragile balance of powers between Sunni and Shiite in the broader Middle East; 
Iran will not lose its client state (Assad-controlled Syria) while Hezbollah will retain the 
protection of its-cross border ally. All neighboring states will benefit from the resolution of the 
conflict and the refugee crisis may be abated.  
VI. Getting Started – Option 3 
 “Option 1”’s weakness is a result of its crafting – a minimalist approach is likely to have a 
minimal effect upon events and the course of the conflict. Regional forces are liable to pursue 
their own intentions rather than the interests of the Coalition or resolution of the conflicts. 
Minimal interference by the Coalition risks ISIL continuing its advances and solidifying its 
control over the territory it holds, committing more massacres and building strength. It is true 
U.S. airstrikes proved extremely effective when conducted in coordination with Northern 
Alliance troops in Afghanistan, with the assistance of CIA operatives on the ground (O’Hanlon 
2014, 2). However, this limited engagement will not solve the problem of unit cohesion in the 
Iraqi Army, or allow political redress of Iraqi Sunni grievances, nor will it force an end to the 
Syrian civil war.  
 “Option 2” calls for a stronger and more sustained response but also has its own risks. Any 
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instance of aerial bombing or missile strikes carries the danger that civilians will be inadvertently 
killed or caught in the midst of ISIL positions or convoys. ISIL has adapted to Coalition 
airstrikes by spreading itself within heavily populated civilian areas and avoiding travel via large 
convoys; therefore the risk that civilians will be harmed by airstrikes is increased. Misguided 
airstrikes that kill civilians will inevitably outrage the population, an outcome that would 
strengthen ISIL and play into its hands (Stein 2014, 3). Providing weaponry and ammunition to 
Syrian opposition and Iraqi ground forces may result in their capture by opposing forces. The 
full-scale retreat of the Iraqi army during ISIL’s first offensives resulted in huge amounts of 
equipment being captured and reused by ISIL. This scenario cannot be repeated. Simultaneously, 
it is difficult to determine what elements of the Syrian opposition are “moderate” and will not 
engage in extremism or war crimes if they retake territory held by the Assad regime. Such war 
crimes would involve culpability of the Coalition forces that supplied these groups. 
 According to Daniel Benjamin of the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think-
tank, striking ISIL with only airstrikes will not solve the problem of terrorism (Benjamin 2014, 
2); a more overarching strategy is required to address the crisis ISIL poses. Michael O’Hanlon of 
the Council on Foreign Relations calls for a force of 1,000 to 5,000 U.S. troops to be embedded 
within “indigenous” forces inside Iraq (O’Hanlon 2014, 3). These would serve as “advisors” to 
conduct training in the field, call in tactical airstrikes against ISIL positions, improve cohesion of 
Iraqi units, and establish a Coalition presence on the ground (O’Hanlon 2014, 3).  
 “Option 3” requires heavy involvement from the Coalition or a UN force and is unlikely to 
have public or international backing. Both the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds would have to agree to the 
implementation of UNSZs and the negotiations would likely be tedious and result in many false 
starts before a resolution of differences could be achieved. Ethnic cleansing – already a brutal 
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aspect of the Syrian civil war – could become more pronounced if balkanization were to occur.  
 Furthermore, the question of a Kurdish state would undoubtedly arise, and pose difficult 
questions for the relevant countries that would be affected – Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Turkey has 
historically been opposed to any idea of a Kurdish state (especially one in which Turkey cedes 
territory), while the question of Kurdish autonomy in Syria is largely unknown. Iraqi Kurdistan 
already enjoys regional autonomy from the central government in Baghdad. At larger question 
would be the position of the combined Peshmerga forces should they force a defeat of ISIL and 
accept the idea of UNSZs within their territory. The creation of a Kurdish state would almost 
certainly be advocated for by many in the Kurdish community (Stein 2014, 4), causing instability 
in Turkey, Iraq and post-war Syria.  
 ISIL’s ascension was made possible by the existence of two failed states fighting pitched 
battles along Islamic sectarian divides. These conflicts have heightened extremism in the area 
and proven conducive for ISIL’s appeal among many of its fighters and to prospective recruits 
(Stansfield 2014, 4). Accordingly, while eliminating ISIL as a terrorist group is the underlying 
objective, resolving these conflicts is the only path of ensuring the impetus to terrorism is 
defused permanently. In other words, it requires the Syrian civil war’s resolution and the creation 
of either a politically stable Iraq or a federation of states in Iraq – states that ensure that Kurdish, 
Sunni and Shiite interests are represented equally. Sunni Iraq was peaceful following the 
Awakening, when Sunni militias allied themselves to the American forces and were hostile 
towards AQI.  
 Destroying ISIL requires a recognition of it as both a terrorist and militia group, and 
choosing a strategy that best addresses the underlying and long-term causes of its development. 
“Option 3” is the most thorough approach and answers the humanitarian catastrophe, political 
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tensions, failed-state situations and regional challenges. It is a far-reaching and ambitious 
strategy, but it has the best chance of destroying ISIL and its capacity to reconstitute itself. 
Denying ISIL safe haven in both Iraq and Syria is not an impossible goal in “Option 3”.  
 “Option 3” best addresses what is in essence a two-part problem: the conflicts in both Syria 
and Iraq and the regional powers perpetuating them. This involves both combating terrorism and 
pursuing effective foreign policies that resolve the states’ interests at hand. I will now address 
these in sequence: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, the Assad Regime, the Syrian Opposition and the 
regional Kurds.  
 Turkey has indicated it will not pursue action against ISIL without actions being taken 
against the Assad regime by the Coalition (Christie-Miller, 1). This was especially evident 
during the battle for Kobane and Turkey’s unwillingness to aid the Syrian Kurds. Once allies of 
Syria, Turkey has been overwhelmed by the influx of over 400,000 Syrian refugees into its 
borders (UNHCR 2013, 2) and incurred $800 million in costs as of May 2013. Estimates by the 
UNHCR show that the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey alone would reach a million by the 
end of 2014 (UNHCR 2013, 2). Subsequently, Turkey has both a practical and a political interest 
in resolving the Syrian civil war. Turkey will likely endorse the idea of UNSZs outside its 
borders in order to relieve the strain on its own refugee camps and services. However, Turkey 
will strongly object to any autonomy of Kurdish territories within Syria due to the conflicts it has 
held with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Turkey fought an insurgency led by the PKK from 
1983 to 2013, resulting in 40,000 deaths (Celebi et al 2014, 1), and would be unwilling to aid in 
the creation of a Kurdish state.  
 Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the majority of Gulf States may regard the Coalition with 
suspicion, and voice their own concerns over regional stability. While it is true that ISIL poses a 
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serious threat to the ruling regimes of these countries, many of them view Iran as a greater threat 
than ISIL. They would want reassurances that a stronger Iraq would not prove a stronger ally to 
Shia Iran. They are also concerned with the possibility of radicalized fighters from their 
countries returning and conducting terrorist attacks against their own citizens.  
 Lebanon’s response would be more intriguing and dangerous, as the country has already 
absorbed a refugee influx that accounts for nearly 20 percent of its overall population. In 
addition, Lebanon already balances a difficult sectarian divide between Sunnis who want to fight 
against Al-Assad and the terrorist organization Hezbollah, whose fighters proved instrumental in 
bolstering Al-Assad in a number of battles. Backdoor diplomacy and additional aid would be 
required to keep the status quo and prevent a breakout of sectarian conflicts. The Lebanese 
government in particular would need to be convinced that they would benefit by allowing tacit 
approval of the Coalition action – putting a temporary halt to the refugee crisis and attempting to 
bring about an end to the Syrian civil war would legitimately be in its best interest.  
 Iran would likely welcome any action taken against ISIL by the United States and its 
Coalition, but would be extremely concerned by the idea of the Assad regime collapsing. The 
goal of bringing about peace to Syria while maintaining Allawite and Shia power bases in the 
country would be their primary goal. The destruction of ISIL would be a step towards this goal; 
however, Al-Assad would likely have to step down as leader of either a re-integrated Syria or 
enjoy a much weakened Syrian Allawite state if the country was divided in a peace deal. Iran 
would find either scenario galling, as Al-Assad has been their long-time client and ally. 
However, working with Coalition forces may well help Iran gain regional influence and re-enter 
the international community as it continues to negotiate over its nuclear program.  
VII. Conclusion 
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 ISIL’s success is attributable to a combination of multiple factors: its appeal to 
marginalized Iraqi Sunnis, its fighting prowess against other forces battling in the Syrian civil 
war, its ideological appeal to fundamentalist Salafist Muslims and its past military victories. It 
operates with impunity due to the failed-state status of northern Syria and western Iraq. 
Dislodging ISIL from its territories will require sustained, prolonged action conducted by 
regional actors supported by Coalition forces with intelligence, logistical support, training and 
political mediation. It will also require long-term thinking on the part of both regional and 
international powers as to how terrorism can be recognized pre-emptively, and question when 
protracted civil conflicts should be forced to an end by external forces to prevent terrorism or 
extremism from developing within failed states. The international community has remained 
gridlocked on the question of the Syrian civil war for over three years, despite the brutality of the 
conflict and the incredible difficulties placed on neighboring states by the mass exodus of Syrian 
refugees.  
 Addressing and forcing an end to the Syrian civil war is therefore integral not only to 
defeating ISIL but to ensuring regional stability. While the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) has been rendered incapable of action by Russian vetoes, a UNSC-approved action 
would not necessarily be required in order to bring about sufficient change in Syria. Russia has 
largely played its hand and ignored international sentiment through its seizure of the Crimea and 
its involvement in the Ukrainian Conflict; as such, it has little legitimacy to denounce foreign 
intervention in Syria.  
 Terrorism is an issue that has persisted for decades, and in the case of the IRA, the conflict 
between it and the United Kingdom lasted nearly 140 years. Terrorism is nothing new to the 
Middle East, yet the threat that ISIL carries is both real and a radical departure from past terrorist 
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groups. Addressing new challenges requires trying original solutions, while incorporating the 
lessons of the past. In the literature review of this essay, I discussed how DDR campaigns proved 
effective following the disbandment of the IRA, massive military action against Hamas proved 
costly and ultimately ineffective, and the protracted struggle against the LTTE combined with 
international mediation, the creation of safe-zones, and a multilateral presence finally culminated 
in a bloody end to the Tamil Tigers. Elements of success can be found in all three of these 
instances. Massive military engagement is needed in order to bring about an end to the Syrian 
civil war, reestablish local and regional balances and combat ISIL directly, while international 
mediation is needed to ensure a ceasefire or peace process between the Assad regime and the 
Syrian Opposition. Implementation of DDR campaigns in both Iraq and Syria stand a chance of 
helping reintegrate disillusioned Sunnis into a new nationalist Iraqi identity and aid security 
forces in their fight against extremism.  
 Perhaps the most daunting aspect of the conflict ISIL is its location: as we have discussed 
before, ending the Syrian civil war is an almost certain prerequisite to eradicating ISIL. This may 
prove more challenging on a multilateral and international level rather than directly confronting 
ISIL in a “boots on the ground” scenario. However, the international community has overlooked 
the Syrian civil war and its horrors for the past three years, and ISIL is one of the consequences 
of following this naïve approach. Eliminating failed-state situations and fanatical, inter-Islamic 
sectarian warfare is imperative to depriving ISIL of its extremist message and basis for support 
by desperate Sunnis. Once the international community recognizes and addresses this reality, it 
will be in a much better position to deprive ISIL of its safe haven in Syria.  
 Resolving Iraq’s internal differences and political tensions will require equal effort. Sunni 
support must be won back, in a process that will require time and genuine goodwill by the new 
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Iraqi government. Granting local autonomy or instituting a quota or confessional system of 
government akin to Lebanon’s system may help smooth over sectarian differences, and convince 
Sunnis that membership in a united Iraq better serves their interests rather than aligning with the 
likes of ISIL. Resolving the inadequacies of Sykes-Picot and the practices of patronage the West 
has pursued, in the eyes of many, may well be the key to crippling anti-Western sentiment in the 
area, and depriving ISIL of another argument in its ideological appeal. The creation of new 
nation-states has never been easy – but the existence of arbitrary states with fundamental, 
irreversible differences has proven to be difficult also. In combating and destroying ISIL, new 
countries may emerge that will enforce security and stability in the region in ways current states 
cannot. The path that the United States and its Coalition take will decide the fate of the region – 
and whether it suffers from the blight of terrorism – for decades to come, just as western powers 
once divided the region up for their own interests nearly a century ago. This time, however, the 
West should act with both its and the inhabitants’ interests at heart – the destruction of ISIL and 
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